could disrupt satellite-based communications.
The second is: Information protection of readiness and interoper-ability, which “really means a highly secured network, seamlessly
integrated with joint and mission
partner environments.” That recognizes that “we’re not going to fight
alone,” but in coalitions, which
could include nations other than
traditional allies, he said.
To work effectively in a coalition,
they must be able to share information, which must be allocated based
on the classification levels that can
be shared with nations other than
the close allies, Westphal said.
The network, or environment, to
share information has to be interop-erable within the Marine Corps and
the joint community, and with “
mission partners,” which includes other
U.S. government departments, including Homeland Security and
State, he said.
Third: Proactive and persistent influence and
engagement, “which means the ability to assess and
influence the target audience in specific operations.”
Westphal said commanders “have to understand the
battlespace, have to understand the adversary. … You
understand not only their material capabilities, but
this speaks to the informational and the cognitive. In
other words, what motivates them. Now that’s all part
of the new battlespace.
“So it’s really those three domains that we’re trying to
bring together and be able to help the commander make
sense of what’s going on in the battlespace, to under-
stand the adversary so it doesn’t become a simple
material-to-material attrition type of battle, but what
motivates him,” he said. “And when you begin to under-
stand what motivates them, you begin to understand
what’s important to them. Then you also understand
how they may be gaining popular support.”
In the “cognitive domain,” Westphal said, the com-
mander can use cyber or other material and non-material
tools “to begin to influence your adversary’s thinking, as
well as whatever support he may be getting from the
Information warfare “is the ability to maneuver not
only in physical domains, but in the informational and
cognitive domains,” he said.
Westphal gave an example of using deceptive infor-
mation, similar to a physical feint, “to make the enemy
think we’re going after a particular thing” so he com-
mits resources to protect that while U.S. forces maneu-
ver against something completely different.
“That enables us to have an advantage by being able
to maneuver in the cognitive domain, rather than just
maneuvering in the physical domain,” he said.
Fourth: Comprehensive sensing and shared under-
standing. Westphal said that is aimed at ensuring the vast
amounts of information and data U.S. forces can collect is
turned into “understanding” for the tactical commanders.
“There’s been an explosion in sensor capability,”
spanning from visual reconnaissance to cyberspace, to
the point that “many commanders have said ‘I’m drowning in data,’” he said. But, “there has to be a commensurate capability to analyze and assess that data. And then
make sense of that data … to achieve understanding and
be able to share that understanding.”
Fifth: Electromagnetic spectrum maneuver and com-
bined arms fires, which focuses on “the integration of
electromagnetic, space and cyberspace with essentially
physical combined arms support,” he said. The capabili-
ty has to be “institutionalized across the force to use
information warfare, to use electronic warfare, to be able
to maneuver within the electromagnetic spectrum.”
But recognizing that there are limited amounts of
bandwidth and frequencies, technology must enable
commanders to switch spectrums so rapidly that it is
worthless for the adversary to attempt to jam them.
Lance Cpl. Joseph A. Daniel provides communication radio checks for the forward element of the combat operations center during the battalion assault course
Feb. 12, 2015, at Marine Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., as
part of Integrated Training Exercise 2-15.