These remote monitoring systems and the ability to
tap in and mine data will help us in that area in terms of
conditionbased maintenance. But I would also say, as I
look at trying to get ships and submarines out on time,
the pendulum may have swung too far. We may be doing
too much conditionbased maintenance. I say that in the
context of if I want to limit growth and not get surprises
later in the availability, there’s got to be a balance.
We’re taking a very close look at maintenance across
the board and asking ourselves if this maintenance is
conditionbased today, would it make sense to go ahead
and make some of this maintenance timedirected?
Tanks are a classic example. Why wouldn’t I plan to
build work into the work package on, say, 20 tanks just
based on data that I’ve had previously, rather than wait
to open and inspect it? If I get in and open and inspect
them, they’re fine, then I’ve got extra budget, but I’ve
already built it into the plan up front, allocated the per
sonnel resources and contracted the work out.
While I’m a strong believer in conditionbased mainte
nance, you shouldn’t be doing maintenance that you don’t
need to do. I’m a strong believer that remote continuous
monitoring systems will allow us to do health monitoring
of systems, which should cut down on maintenance.
How does a continuing resolution (CR) affect
your ability to get the ships out on time?
MOORE: We’ve been on CRs so long now — nine
straight years — it has almost become the new normal.
We’ve almost come to expect the CR now, so we’re better
at how we manage the money. For instance, when we
start scheduling the maintenance availabilities, we try
to avoid putting a major maintenance availability that
starts in the first quarter of the fiscal year.
It doesn’t impact the naval shipyards that much
because they are mission funded and, so, they have
public employees and we pay their salaries for the year.
It does have an impact on the private sector. If you are a
business and I say “you only get to go operate in three of
the four quarters of your business cycle,” any CEO [chief
executive officer] would tell me, “Hey, you’re nuts.”
Promoting a culture of affordability is one of
your priorities. Any examples of success?
MOORE: In the naval shipyards, we have learning cen
ters now that allow us to train our workforce in an envi
ronment where new workers can fail outside the ship
and correct their skills before working on a ship. That
way, we don’t get the rework that we would have before.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard has got a good learning
center in welding. In the past, it would’ve probably
taken us five yearsplus to train a new apprentice welder
to get to the journeyman level to the point where we
would’ve felt comfortable allowing them to go do major
welding on a submarine.
Just recently, we had to make pressurehull cuts on
USS Hawaii. Two welders who had only been in the ship
yard for three years welded the steel plate back on the
pressure hull. We have very detailed processes to make
sure that the weld is satisfactory. They passed with flying
colors. There were no flaws in the weld. That ability to
get the work done in fewer hours to avoid the rework is
just one example of making every dollar count.
Hybrid electric drive on the surface ships, for instance,
is something that is going to result in huge costs savings.
We are designing our ships to reduce manpower because
people are the most expensive part of the lifecycle cost
of the ship.
The littoral combat ship, the Zumwaltclass DDG
and the [Gerald R.] Fordclass aircraft carrier were
designed from the bottom up to be easier to maintain
and operate with fewer people. On a Nimitzclass car
rier today, people account for about 40 percent of the
total lifecycle costs of the ship. When you factor in
the costs to build it, maintain it, refuel it, operate it
and then dispose of it, the total is $32 billion in [fiscal]
2008 dollars over 50 years, and 40 percent of that cost
Are you having successes in promoting commonality in auxiliary subsystems?
MOORE: We stood up our commonality division, NAVSEA
06, several years ago to kind of go look at that. The instiga
tor for that was when I was in PEO Carriers.
We recognized that York was building six or seven
different air conditioning units — one for carriers, one
for subs, one for surface ships, one for LCS — and, in
each case, each of the PEOs was giving their own specs.
So, if you’re York, you’ll pick the most stringent spec so
that you can ship the unit out to the Navy and the Navy
will accept it. That was driving costs into it. What we
recognized is, “Hey, we ought to get together on this.”
“We’ve recognized that we’ve got to be honest with ourselves, understand the
requirement up front and then match that requirement to the capacity available
in the shipyard. NAVSEA has got to be held accountable and the naval shipyards
have got to be held accountable to get more productive going forward.”